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Abstract
In the last years the Prisoner Dilemma (PD) has become a paradigm for
the study of the emergence of cooperation in spatially structured populations.
Such structure is usually assumed to be given by a graph. In general, the
success of cooperative strategies is associated with the possibility of forming
globular clusters, which in turn depends on a feature of the network that is
measured by its clustering coefficient. In this work we test the dependence
of the success of cooperation with the clustering coefficient of the network,
for several different families of networks. We have found that this depen-
dence is far from trivial. Additionally, for both stochastic and deterministic
dynamics we have also found that there is a strong dependence on the ini-
tial composition of the population. This hints at the existence of several
different mechanisms that could promote or hinder cluster expansion. We
have studied in detail some of these mechanisms by concentrating on com-
pletely ordered networks (large clustering coefficient) or completely random
networks (vanishing clustering coefficient).
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1. Introduction
The emergence of cooperation in different real systems has been puzzling
researchers in several areas devoted to the study of systems involving so-
cial, economic or biological organization. Even though each of these systems
is conformed by single units with natural competitive tendencies, the emer-
gence of collective behaviours is undeniable. While natural selection operates
through competition, cooperation is essential to the evolution and emergence
of higher degrees of complexity. The struggle between competition and co-
operation is then one of the keys in understanding the self organization of
complex systems conformed by interacting units. Still, many questions arise
regarding how such opposites forces can coexist.
The survival of the cooperative behavior is a classical problem of game
theoretical approaches [1]. In this context, the paradigmatic Prisoner’s Dilemma
game [2] has been widely studied in different versions. It is usually formulated
as a standard model for the confrontation between cooperative and selfish
behaviors. For many years it was implemented in zero dimensional systems,
where every player can interact with any other, until the crucial effects of
spatial distribution were finally noticed [3, 4]. Since then, several mecha-
nisms for the evolution of cooperation have been proposed. Some of them
are summarized in [5]: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity,
group selection and network reciprocity. Here we have chosen to focus on
this last mechanism, which is associated to the fact that a cooperative indi-
vidual can take advantage of the topology of the network to form clusters of
cooperators that are often resilient to the invasion of cooperators.
Studies about the effect of network reciprocity have dominated the litera-
ture on spatial distributed games in the last years [4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. They
were the response to the need of studying the evolution of the strategies of
players of a game beyond the simplifying assumption of a well-mixed pop-
ulation, where everybody interacts equally likely with everybody else. The
observation that real populations are not well mixed and the fact that spa-
tial structures could affect the evolution of a game and the strategies of the
players demanded a new approach. A natural step was to consider complex
networks as models for the underlying topology characterizing the spatial or
social structures. In the case of a game played on top of a network or graph,
the individuals of a population are located on the vertices of the graph. The
edges of the graph determine the links through which individuals can inter-
act. In a spatial model for the prisoner dilemma, the players are classified
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either as cooperators or defectors, and it is assumed that every agent can
only play with his/her neighbours.
It has been shown that extremely simple rules determine whether network
reciprocity can favor cooperation [10]. But it is the concept that cooperators
can prevail by forming clusters what we want to analyze here. This idea has
been discussed and analyzed in many works. In [5] it is found that coopera-
tors can prevail by forming network clusters, where they help each other. In
one of the pioneering works on spatially extended games [4] the authors have
analyzed several shapes for a cluster of cooperators and test the stability of
each one against the invasion by defectors. They found that cooperators can
only survive and grow if they form clusters. Another work pointing out the
clustering effect is [12] where it was stated that cooperators can survive by
forming clusters within which they benefit from mutual cooperation, that in
turn, allows them screening the exploitation by defectors throughout the bor-
ders of the cluster. It must be mentioned that some authors found an inverse
relationship between the formation of clusters and the success of cooperation
[13].
In this work we intend to show that the survival of cooperators involves
much more than the conformation of clusters. If it depended only on that,
cooperation success would increase monotonically with the clustering coef-
ficient of the underlying network. By focusing on the analysis of networks
which only differ in their clustering coefficient, in the next sections we show
not only that this does not happen (i.e. the equilibrium fraction of coop-
erators is a non monotonic function of C) but also that there is a strong
dependence on the composition of the initial population. This hints at the
existence of several mechanisms responsible for the expansion or extinction
of cluster of cooperators. To find these mechanisms, in the last section we
focus on what happens for populations in completely ordered and completely
disordered networks. A detailed analysis allows us to understand the impor-
tant of the initial fraction of cooperators for the evolution of the different
systems.
2. The model
The prisoner dilemma is a caricature of a real situation in which selfish
and altruist tendencies compete. It has been the subject of study of game
theory for the last 60 years [14, 2, 5]. Its name and formal elaboration is
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attributed to A. Tucker, who mentioned it in a classroom in 1950, but it was
not until 1952 that the first results about it were published [15].
The formulation of the prisoner dilemma as a game is rather simple. It is
played by two players who must choose their moves between two strategies:
to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). The reward, or payoff, obtained by each
player after one round of the game is given by Table 1:
C D
C r s
D t p
Table 1: Payoff table for the prisoner’s dilemma: the strategy in each row gets the payoff
given by the table when playing again the strategies in the columns.
Each element in the payoff matrix represents the payoff of a player using
the strategies in the rows, when confronting a player choosing the strategies
in the columns. A defector D receives t, the temptation to defect, when its
opponent is a cooperator (C), who in turn gets s, the sucker’s payoff. In case
of mutual cooperation, each player obtains a reward r, while mutual defection
punishes both players with the payoff p. The table is in fact very general,
because the payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma must satisfy the additional
constraints t > r > p > s and 2r > t + s. Other relationships between the
parameters define the Snowdrift and Stag Hunt games [8].
In some versions of the game a different set of parameters is used: r =
c − b, s = −b, t = c and p = 0 [10], to account for a slightly different
interpretation of the game: a cooperator (C) is someone who pays a cost c
for any other individual to receive a benefit b. In turn, a defector does not
distribute any benefits and gets those delivered by the cooperators at no cost.
To simplify the analysis, in the following we use a reduced version of
the payoff table (Table 2), which has only one free parameter. It has been
show that this parameter eduction preserves the most relevant features of
the prisoner’s dilemma [3].
C D
C 1 1− t
D t 0
Table 2: Reduced payoff table for the prisoner’s dilemma: the strategy in each row gets
the payoff given by the table when playing again the strategies in the columns.
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In order to study the possibility that the players can change their strate-
gies as a result of their previous interactions, thus generating an evolution-
ary dynamics of strategies, many authors started to work with the iterated
Prisoner Dilemma, in which players interact by iteratively playing the game
several times. The history of successes or failures of each player is recorded
in what is called his cumulative payoff. How the players use the information
accumulated in their own and others cumulative payoffs is what defines the
rules of evolution. Operationally, the evolutionary dynamics acts at a cer-
tain instance of the game, for example after everybody has played against
everybody else, when players decide whether to change strategies or not, fol-
lowing certain update rules. Before all the players start again playing the
game, all the cumulative payoffs are set to 0. The spectra of rules of evo-
lution is wide and ranges from purely deterministic to stochastic dynamics
[10, 16, 17, 18, 19].
Complementary to the evolutionary aspects mentioned above, many au-
thors started to analyze spatial games in order to cope with the limitations
associated with the assumption that players were always part of a well mixed
population. [3, 4, 8].
The evolutionary behaviour of the populations of surviving strategies of
spatial games on networks can be affected by several features of the underly-
ing topology as, for example, the degree distribution of the graph, the average
distance between nodes, or the clustering coefficient [6, 7, 20, 18, 11].
The concept that cooperators can survive by grouping in clusters has
been discussed and analyzed in many works [10, 4, 12]. Intuitively, the rea-
soning goes as follows. The effect of the cluster would be to screen the nodes
at the interior from the presence of defectors. As defectors can only get an
advantage from their interaction with cooperators, only those located next
to the border of a cluster of cooperators should collect any benefits. In turn,
although the cooperators at the border of the cluster should have lower pay-
offs because of their interaction with defectors, their cooperator neighbours
at the interior of the cluster should perform better than the defectors at
the border. Thus, imitating the internal cooperators should be always more
convenient than imitating the bordering defectors, which should lead to the
survival, and even expansion, of the cluster of cooperators. The problem is
that all these arguments, as well as the very definition of ‘cluster’, depend
crucially on the structure of the network. The most important feature in this
regard is the clustering coefficient C, which measures how connected is the
neighbourhood of each node, on average. The existence of local transitive
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relationships, closely related to the clustering [22], is what defines the pos-
sibility of survival of small clusters of cooperators. Paradoxically, it will be
also responsible for the negative effect that an isolated cooperator may have
on incipient cooperative clusters.
Here we use the definition of global clustering coefficient of Watts and
Strogatz [21]. For each node i, its local clustering coefficient is defined as the
quotient between the number of links joining nodes of the neighbourhood of
i divided by the total number of possible links (ki(ki+1)). C is then defined
as the average over i of all local clustering coefficients. We study the influ-
ence of C on the evolutionary dynamics of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma,
but keeping the degree distribution constant, to disentangle both contribu-
tions. For this we analyze regular networks (i.e. with the same number of
neighbours for every node) with different values of C, generated with the fol-
lowing algorithm. Starting from an ordered network (defined below) we select
at random two pairs of connected nodes. Then we ‘cut’ both connections and
connect each individual to one of the individuals it had not been connected
before. In other words, the connections are swapped. If this change gives a
network with larger C, it is accepted and the network is updated. If it does
not increase C, the change is only accepted with a fixed (and typically small)
probability. This process goes on until the clustering coefficient has reached
the desired value. Notice that this procedure leaves the degree distribution
of the original network unchanged. When the desired clustering coefficient
is very low, it is to be expected that the resulting networks is very close to
a regular random network, independently of the starting one. On the other
hand, for larger values of C it is to be expected that the effect of the start-
ing network is much larger. For this reason we use two different starting
networks: ring networks where each node is connected symmetrically to the
closest k nodes, and 2-dimensional lattice networks. The networks gener-
ated from these two classes are called, respectively, random ring networks or
random lattice networks. Three different starting lattice networks are used:
regular square lattices (k = 4), triangular lattices (k = 6) and square lattices
where each node is connected to its Moore neighbourhood (k = 8). For all
values of k ring networks can be considered as one-dimensional because for
a given cluster of nodes the size of the surface is independent of the volume
whereas for lattice network the relationship is V ≈ S2.
Throughout our simulations, we have considered two types of evolutionary
dynamics, one deterministic [8] and the other stochastic [10]. In both cases,
each player either copies the strategy of one of its neighbours or sticks to the
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same strategy used in the previous round. In the deterministic dynamics each
player copies the strategy of its most successful neighbour, if the payoff of that
neighbour is larger than its own. In the probabilistic dynamics, previously
used in [10], it copies the strategy of a neighbour chosen at random, with
a probability proportional to its relative payoff. His own strategy is also
included in the pool of eligible strategies. As the results we have obtained are
qualitatively the same for both types of dynamics, in the following we focus
on the deterministic dynamics, and comment briefly on the small differences
obtained when using the stochastic dynamics
3. Numerical Results
As mentioned in the previous section, we consider two different dynamics,
though explicit results corresponding to only one of them will be shown in
the following paragraphs. In all the cases we consider regular networks with
1000 to 10000 nodes with even degrees between 4 and 8. We observe no
dependence on the size but different regimes associated to the degree. The
state of the nodes is synchronically updated and the payoff of each player
is not cumulative in time. Even though we observe that different initial
concentrations of cooperators, ρc(0), lead to qualitatively the same results,
when properly scaled, there are some important differences. To show this
we use two different initial concentrations of cooperators, ρc(0) = 0.1 and
ρc(0) = 0.5 for every network analyzed in this paper.
If the equilibrium value of ρc is plotted as a function of t, leaving all
the other parameters constant, a piecewise constant function is obtained
as is shown in Fig.1. This has also been previously noticed [20], but with a
different payoff table (in the case considered in [20] a cooperator gets 0 payoff
when playing against a defector). To understand the origin, and quantify
the limits, of these steps, we must consider the necessary conditions for the
propagation of the cooperating behavior. For a cooperator to have a chance
to turn a defecting neighbour into a cooperating one, its payoff should be at
least larger than that of the defecting neighbour. This leads to the condition
nCC + (k − nCC)(1 − t) > nDCt, where nCC is the number of cooperator
neighbors of the cooperator and nDC is the number of cooperator neighbors
of the defector. The condition on t can be written as t > k/(k − n) where
n = nCC − nDC . Note that, as nCC ≤ k − 1 and nDC ≥ 1, n is a natural
number that must satisfy 1 ≤ n ≤ k − 2. This gives a maximum of k − 1
possible steps. Note however that in some networks the range of possible
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Figure 1: Steady cooperator density ρc as a function of the parameter t for three different
networks: k = 4 (lattice), random lattice with C = 0.2 starting from a lattice with k = 6,
and idem with k = 8.
values for n is smaller, and therefore the number of steps of ρc is at most
k − 2. In general, for networks with the same number of k the number
of possible steps will be smaller for the networks with smaller clustering
coefficients. As an example, consider the two extreme cases of a tree and
a lattice network with k = 8: whereas the tree has the maximum possible
of steps, the lattice network can have at most 4 steps. In all cases the
last step corresponds to ρc = 0 because for those values of t a cooperator,
regardless of the composition of its neighbourhood, is not able to turn a
defecting neighbour into a cooperating one. Furthermore, it is also possible
that, because of geometrical constraints, ρc also vanishes for other steps. For
the networks analyzed in this paper, we have confirmed that only the height
of the steps depends on C. Furthermore, simulations show that only for the
first two steps the final number of cooperators is non vanishing (see Fig.1).
For these reasons we have only analyzed the dependence of rhoc in these
first two steps, i.e. we have used only two values of t, t1 and t2, that satisfy
1 < t1 < k/(k − 1) and k/(k − 1) < t2 < k/(k − 2).
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Figure 2: Steady cooperator density ρc as a function of the clustering coefficient C, for
k = 4 and ρc(0) = 0.5. (l) and (r) in the caption refer to lattice and ring networks
respectively.
In Figs. 2 to 4 we plot the numerical results obtained from computational
simulations with 1000 to 5000 agents. Each curve corresponds to the average
fraction of cooperators in the steady state, as a function of the clustering
of the networks. The highest clustering value corresponds to the ordered
network (lattice or ring), and networks get increasingly disordered as C is
decreased.
We begin by analyzing what happens for evolutions whose initial state
consists of the same number of cooperators and defectors. In other words,
the initial probability that a given agent is a cooperator is 0.5. In this case,
the steady state is always composed by a finite fraction of cooperators. As
can be seen in the figures, there are some features that are common to all the
families of networks analyzed. The first is that, for each class of network, the
behaviors of the curves is qualitatively the same for the two values of t used.
The only difference is that, as is to be expected, curves for t1 are below curves
for t2. Another important feature is that the final fraction of cooperators for
ordered networks is always larger than what is obtained in completely random
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Figure 3: Steady cooperator density ρc as a function of the clustering coefficient C, for
K = 6 and ρc(0) = 0.5. (l) and (r) in the caption refer to lattice and ring networks
respectively.
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networks. Even though this seems to confirm the impression that clustering
is beneficial to cooperators, it must be noticed that many curves are not
monotonic with C, as for example, all curves corresponding to random ring
networks.
Another interesting feature to notice is that, for ring networks the ad-
dition of a very small amount of disorder causes an abrupt decrease in the
steady fraction of cooperators. This happens because of the one-dimensional
nature of the ring: rewiring very few links at each side of a cooperation
cluster can be very effective in stopping its expansion. When more links are
rewired the dimensionality of the system begins to increase and cooperators
clusters find new directions to expand.
For all values of C curves for random ring networks are always below those
for random lattice networks, for the same values of t. This is probably related
to the lower dimensionality of the substrate of the random ring network that
may have an influence even for high values of the disorder. Notice that the
curves only overlap for very small values of the clustering coefficient. This
means that a large amount of disorder is needed for the network to ‘forget’
the starting substrate.
In Fig. 2 only one point is shown for random lattice networks because
both the square lattice and the completely random network with k = 4 have
a vanishing clustering coefficient. The large difference seen in Fig. 2 between
the steady state fraction of cooperators could be attributed to the much
shorter minimal distances between nodes in random regular networks (which
have a diameter ≈ logN [23]) or to the presence of short loops in the square
lattice (see next section).
When the initial state has less collaborators, the situation is more complex
to analyze because for some systems the population evolves to an equilibrium
state where all the cooperators have been eliminated. If, however, we consider
only those systems that have a steady state with a non vanishing fraction
of cooperators, the picture is very similar to what is found for ρ = 0.5. An
example of this for k = 6 is shown in Fig. 8 where the initial fraction of
cooperators was ρc = 0.1 (compare Figs. 5 and 8).
When, instead, the fraction of realizations that converge is considered,
the picture that emerges is rather different, as Figs. 6 and 8 show. In this
case, ordered networks are less favourable for the preservation (and eventual
expansion) of cooperation than completely random networks. As before, the
behaviour between these two extremes is not monotonic. A feature of these
curves that stands out is that, for the same values of C, they seem to depend
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Figure 4: Steady cooperator density ρc as a function of the clustering coefficient C, for
K = 8 and ρc(0) = 0.5. (l) and (r) in the caption refer to lattice and ring networks
respectively.
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Figure 5: Steady cooperator density ρc as a function of the clustering coefficient C, for
K = 6 and ρc(0) = 0.1. (l) and (r) in the caption refer to lattice and ring networks
respectively. Only those realizations that showed to the survival of cooperators were
considered.
very weakly on the type of substrate used to generate them.
The difference of the evolutionary dynamics of populations starting from
many, or few, cooperators can be shown even more clearly using the same
variable for both cases: the average fraction of steady state cooperators, with
the average taken over the whole population. But it must be recalled that
for populations with small numbers of initial cooperators the variable does
not give atypical value of final cooperators because the steady state coop-
erators distribution has at least two modes clearly separated, one with zero
cooperators and other with many cooperators. We have used this variable to
show that for some stochastic dynamics the results are very similar to what
has been described above for a deterministic dynamics. In the stochastic
dynamics we have used, the agents choose the strategy of a neighbor with a
probability proportional to the corresponding cumulative payoff, but only if
it is larger than his/her own cumulative payoff [10]. Fig. 7 shows some results
for this dynamics. Curves for several different values of t are shown because
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Figure 6: Fraction of realizations that converge to a steady state with a positive number
of cooperators, for networks with k = 8.
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Figure 7: Average value of the steady-state fraction of cooperators for a stochastic evo-
lutionary dynamics, for several values of t for random ring networks with k = 8, and for
ρc(0) = 0.5 (panel A) and ρc(0) = 0.1 (panel B).
in this case, the dependence on t is not as simple as in the deterministic case.
In any case, several qualitative similarities with the deterministic case are
apparent. For ρ = 0.5 the ordered networks are more favourable to coop-
eration than completely disordered ones, at least for t ≤ 1.15. For ρ = 0.1
the situation is reversed, and now the most favorable networks in terms of
cooperation are completely random ones. There are even some values of t
for which the dependence with C is not monotonic.
So far we have shown that the clustering coefficient of the networks has
an important influence on the steady state. But whether or not this influence
is beneficial depends strongly on the initial fraction of cooperators, both for
deterministic and stochastic evolutionary dynamics. The possible causes for
this are addressed in the next section.
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Figure 8: Fraction of realizations that converge to a steady state with a positive number
of cooperators, for networks with k = 6.
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4. Role of the initial fraction of cooperators
To understand the conflicting ways in which network clustering can affect
cooperation we study in some detail the deterministic dynamics, and hope
that some conclusions apply also to the stochastic case. Furthermore, in
terms of the range of possible clustering coefficients we limit ourselves to
analyze what happens for networks at the two extremes: completely ordered
(large C) and completely disordered (small C) networks. For this last class we
concentrate on lattice networks with k = 6 and k = 8 which have clustering
coefficients C = 2/5 (k = 6) and C = 3/7 (k = 8),
First, we analyze the fate of a cluster of 3 cooperators. In the case of
the lattice networks with k = 6 and k = 8, there are two and three possible
configurations, respectively (see Fig.11). However, all of them are unstable
because, thanks to the large clustering, some neighbors of the cluster can be
connected to 2 or 3 cooperators in the cluster, having thus a larger payoff
than any of them. On the other hand, in a random network there is a finite
probability (1 − 3k2/N + O(k/N)) that all the neighbors of a 3-cluster are
not neighbors of more than 1 cooperator, and thus the cluster is stable. Fur-
thermore, if this cluster does not disappear it will grow to become a cluster
of k+1 cooperators (a central cooperator surrounded by cooperators). This
cluster, in turn, has a non vanishing probability of continuing its expansion.
For example, if there is a link joining two of the new surrounding coopera-
tors (which happens with probability (k/N)k(k−1)/2), the cluster grows by
turning into cooperators the 2(k−2) non-cooperating neighbors of the nodes
that share the link (see Fig. 10A). But there is now a non vanishing proba-
bility that there is also a link joining the nodes of the cluster ’surface’ which
would lead to an increase of its size of 2(k− 2). And, in general, at any step
of its growth it could keep growing with a probability roughly proportional
to (k/N)Ns2(k − 2), where Ns is the size of the cluster surface. Considering
that most of the nodes of the clusters lie in its surface, implies that once the
cluster has reached a size of order N/(2k(k − 2)) it will keep growing until
it spans the whole lattice. Thus, if we consider the evolution of all possible
3-clusters, the distribution of final cluster sizes should be non-vanishing only
for sizes O(N) and for sizes smaller than O(N/(2k(k − 2))).
In the case of 4-clusters, it is easy to see that the situation is qualita-
tively the same for regular random networks. On the other hand, for lattice
networks the picture is completely different: square 4-clusters expand until
they occupy the whole lattice because every cooperator is connected to 2
17
or 3 others whereas non cooperating neighbours can only have at most 2
cooperating neighbours.
Taking these ideas into account, and assuming that cluster expansion or
death is not influenced by the presence of cooperators outside the cluster, we
can try to predict what happens when cooperators are placed at random in
a network. In the case of a lattice network, the probability of an initial set
of cooperators taking over the network is simply the probability that there
is at least one square cluster of cooperators: P (p) = 1 − (1 − p4)N . For a
random regular network the probability is P (p) = 1−(1−f(p, k,N))N , where
f(p, k,N) is the probability that a given node is the center of a 3-cluster and
that it expands during at least two steps:
f(p, k,N) = (1− (1− k/N)4(k−2)(k−2))(1− (1− k/N)
k(k−1)
2 )
(1− (1− p)k − kp(1− p)k−1) (1)
where the first term in the product is the probability that a given node has
at least two cooperating neighbors, the second is the probability that the
3-cluster expands in the first step, and the third is the probability that it
continues expanding in the second step. We assume that after the second
step the expansion goes on until all the lattice is occupied by cooperators.
Fig. 11 shows that these functions overestimate the fraction of populations
that are able to take over the whole network. This shows that, somewhat
paradoxically, the presence of other cooperators can sometimes hinder the
expansion of a cluster. For example, if a square has 2 defecting neighbors,
connected to opposite sides of the square, and in turn connected to at least
one cooperator outside of the cluster, the square disappears. Note that a
4-cluster in a random network is harder to destroy because a neighbour of
the cluster is a neighbour only to one cooperator of the cluster and thus it
needs two other cooperating neighbors to be able to destabilize the cluster.
Evidently, 3-clusters are much easier to destabilize, as the partial failure of
the estimate shows. Fig. 10B shows one way a 3-cluster can be destabilized
by a close cooperator.
Interestingly, there is also a mechanism by which different clusters can
collaborate in each other’s expansion, given that the average distance between
nodes is small enough. Consider for instance a couple of stable stars of
cooperators in a random network. If they are connected, i.e. if a cooperator of
one star is connected to a cooperator in the other, these cooperators would be
18
Figure 9: 3-clusters in a lattice network with k = 8. Black circles represent cooperators
and white circles represent defectors.
able to turn their non-cooperating neighbors into cooperators, thus increasing
the size of the two clusters by (2k−2). In a random network, the probability
that two clusters of size N1 and N2 are connected is 1− (1− k/n)
N1n2 .
Taking all these features into account it is possible to give a better es-
timate for the fraction of systems that converge to a final state dominated
by cooperators or with only a few (O(1)) stable cooperators. The probabil-
ity that the cooperator population dies out is (1 − pPs)
N where Ps is the
probability that a cooperator survives the first time step:
Ps(k, P,N) =
k∑
j=2
(
k
j
)
pj(1− p)k−j
(
j−2∑
i=0
(
k − 1
i
)
pi(1− p)k−1−i
)k−j
(2)
which is simply the sum of the probabilities of having j cooperator neighbours
multiplied by the probability that none of the k − j defecting neighbors has
more than j − 2 cooperating neighbors. The probability of the final state
being dominated by cooperators can be approximated by:
P (p) = 1− (1− Ps)
pN
−
pN∑
i=1
(
pN
i
)
P is(1− Ps)
pN−i(1− k/N)ki(ki−1)/2 (3)
Each addend gives the probability of having i stars and that they are not
connected.
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Figure 10: Evolution of two different 3-clusters in a random network with k = 4. Black
circles represent cooperators and white circles represent defectors. A) Expansion of a
3-cluster. B) Disappearance of a 3-cluster.
It is interesting to see what happens for networks with k = 4 because both
lattice and random regular networks have vanishing clustering coefficients.
Fig. 12 shows that the probability of taking over the whole population is
rather similar for both networks. Interestingly, in this case there is also the
possibility of having a final state with a small number of stable cooperators,
for the lattice network. The reason is very similar to the case of random reg-
ular networks and is a consequence of having a vanishing cluster coefficient:
a lineal cluster of 3 cooperators cannot be destabilized because no neighbor
can be a neighbor to more than 1 cooperator of the cluster.
5. Conclusions
It has been sometimes suggested that one of the possible reasons for
the success of cooperating strategies in spatially structured populations is
the possibility of forming globular clusters. In this way, cooperators inside
the cluster are ‘protected’ by the ones on the border. If the populations is
placed on a graph, the ‘globularity’ of the possible clusters is proportional to
the clustering coefficient. Therefore, cooperating strategies should be more
successful in networks with large C than in networks with small C. For
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Figure 11: Fraction of systems that converge to a state dominated by cooperators (full
symbols) or to a state with a few stable cooperators (empty symbols), as a function of the
initial fraction of cooperators, for regular random networks (circles) and lattice networks
(triangles), with k = 8. The lines show the theoretical estimates, assuming independence
(full lines) or dependence (dashed lines) among all clusters of cooperators.
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Figure 12: Fraction of systems that converge to a state dominated by cooperators (full
symbols) or to a state with a few stable cooperators (empty symbols), as a function of the
initial fraction of cooperators, for random regular networks (circles) and lattice networks
(triangles), with k = 4. The lines show the theoretical estimates assuming dependence
among all clusters of cooperators.
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the evolutionary dynamics studied here we confirm that this is indeed the
case when the fraction of cooperators in the steady state is compared in
random regular networks (low C) and lattice networks (large C) having the
same degree distributions. However, by analyzing populations in graphs with
intermediate values of C, we find that the equilibrium fraction of cooperators
is not a monotonic function of C.
The results commented above were obtained using initial populations with
many cooperators (half of the population, on average). But if the initial pop-
ulation has much less cooperators, the situation becomes more complex. On
the one hand one finds that some evolutions lead to the elimination of all
cooperators. On the other hand, when cooperators do not disappear, their
final fraction, as a function of C has a similar behaviour to that observed
when there are many initial cooperators. The problem is that the number
of such evolutions is much smaller for ordered networks than for disordered
ones, the behaviour for intermediate values of C also being non monotonic.
The situation is then very different from that obtained from initial popula-
tions with more cooperators. The same difference appears when stochastic
evolutionary dynamics are analyzed.
The non monotonicity of the curves, together with the dependence on the
initial condition suggest that there might be several mechanisms that influ-
ence the success or failure of cooperation. In the last section we have shown
that this is indeed the case, at least for completely ordered or completely
disordered networks. In ordered networks the evolution is isotropic and de-
terministic: wherever it is placed, a square cluster of 4 cooperators is always
able to expand. But in disordered networks the fate of the cluster depends
on where in the network it is located: given a large enough network there are
positions from where a cluster of 3 cooperators will be able to grow to a very
large size. In other words, in disordered networks smaller clusters are able to
expand than in the case of ordered networks, but only if they are placed in
the right places. Additionally, we have shown that it is not uncommon that
cooperators that are outside, but not very far, from a cluster of cooperators,
can actually hinder its expansion and even lead to its disappearance.
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